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United States Constitution

Vl.

OVERVIEW
Approximately a month before the State filed its Brief of Respondent (“State’s Brief”),
the U.S. Supreme Court issued two opinions that supported arguments that defendant John
Allison Huckabay (“Huckabay”) had advanced in Appellant’s Opening Brief. In United States v.
Davis, 588 U.S. ___ , 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), the Court found an enhanced criminal penalty
provision for possessing a firearm while committing a crime of violence to be unconstitutionally
vague. Authoring the majority opinion, Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote: “Vague laws . . . leave
people with no sure way to know what consequences will attach to their conduct.” Id. at 2323.
In United States v. Rehaif, 588 U.S. ___ , 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019), the Court reversed a conviction
for illegal alien in possession of a firearm because the trial court, over a defense objection,
instructed the jury that the government did not have to prove as an element of the offense that the
defendant knew that his immigration status had changed and he was illegally or unlawfully in the
country when he visited a firing range. The Court observed that interpreting the statute to
include a scienter requirement “is consistent with a basic principle that underlies the criminal
law, namely, the importance of showing what Blackstone called ‘a vicious will.’” Id. at 2196
(quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 21 (1769)).
Nine days before the State filed its Brief, this Court issued an opinion that supported one
of the constitutional arguments Huckabay had advanced in Appellant’s Opening Brief. In State
v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, 444 P.3d 877 (2019), this Court reversed a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance upon concluding that the temporary permit statute for motor vehicles was
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant. This Court determined that the statute,
-1-

which provided the basis for a vehicle stop, failed to “provide sufficient clarity and definiteness
that a person of ordinary intelligence can understand what behavior is required” and invited
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by officers. Id. at ___, 444 P.3d at 879-80, 884.
The State’s Brief did not address either of the recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions or this
Court’s recent opinion. Rather, the State attacks Huckabay’s central contentions by re-writing
the dictionary definition of “combination” to include zero plus one; by arguing that this Court
should adopt the State’s interpretation of I.C. § 36-1401(c)(3) without looking beyond the
language of the subsection because the State claims the subsection is unambiguous and its
interpretation is so obviously correct; by drawing an unwarranted inference from the word
“single” in connection with the reimbursable damage assessment in Section 36-1401(c)(3); by
refusing to acknowledge the significance of the enforcement pattern by Idaho Department of Fish
and Game that reflects that every felony charge involving a moose spanning a seventeen-year
period encompassed two or more big game animals; by deriving from the opinion in State v.
Hughes, 161 Idaho 826, 392 P.3d 4 (Ct. App. 2014), a conclusion on an issue that was not before
the Court of Appeals; by contending that a person can commit a felony violation of Section 361401(c)(3) without having any scienter or mens rea or without knowing that his associate did not
comply with regulatory requirements; and by asserting that any errors that the Kootenai County
Prosecutor’s Office and the trial court made did not prejudice Huckabay. For the reasons set
forth below, the State’s arguments are unpersuasive.

-2-

ARGUMENT
A.

A Combination of Numbers or Species, and Not the Possession of a Single Moose, is
Required to Constitute a Felony Violation of I.C. § 36-1401(c)(3)
1. A Single Moose Does Not Satisfy the Statutory Language for a Felony

Urging this Court to reject Huckabay's argument that a single moose cannot satisfy the
threshold for a felony violation ofl.C. § 36-1401(c)(3) because the statute requires a
"combination of numbers or species," the State contends that "cold arithmetical reality'' defeats
the argument. State's Brief at p. 9. Significantly, the State concedes there is no violation of LC.

§ 36-1401(c)(3) without a combination of something.
According to the State, the "combination" language in LC. § 36-1401(c)(3) is
"unambiguous" because zero is a number so zero plus one moose constitutes a combination of
numbers. State's Brief at pp. 8-9. The State asserts, without supporting authority, that "any
combination of numbers is a broad inclusive grant, which would include the number 'one."'
State's Brief at p. 8. 1

1

As this Reply Brief will address in more detail in SectionA2(iii), infra, the State's assertion
that language of the statute should be read as "a broad inclusive grant" runs afoul of the basic tenet
that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. "In light of the serious consequences flowing from
a criminal conviction, the rule of strict construction rests on the principle that 'no [person] shall be
held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed."'
United States v. Hilton, 701 F.3d 959, 966 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 937 (2013),
(quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997)). Huckabay most definitely incurred
serious consequences as a result of this felony conviction. Huckabay, age 65, had no prior criminal
history and no history of substance abuse. Confidential Documents, pp. 1, 4, 8. Although the Bureau
of Probation and Parole identified Huckabay as a candidate for a withheld judgment, the district
court rejected the request. Id. at p. 11; Tr. p. 47. Instead, the trial court imposed a prison sentence
of one year fixed, one year indeterminate, suspended for two years, together with a $25,000 fine, a
$1,500 civil penalty, a $250 processing fee, and a three-year hunting license revocation. Tr. pp. 4849. The court placed Huckabay on probation, ordered him to serve 30 days oflocal incarceration to
be completed within three months of sentencing, and precluded him from work release. Id. at 49.
The trial court denied Huckabay's request to stay the incarceration pending appeal. R., p. 729. A
-3-

This "zero plus one moose equals a combination" theory conflicts with the common
dictionary definition of the word "combination": "an act of combining two or more things."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER2 , http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/combination. 3 The State
neither disputes the common dictionary definition nor offers an alternate definition that would
undermine Huckabay' s argument. Instead, the State responds with an inaccurate hyperbole that
Huckabay's argument "hinges on a mind-bending premise that zero is not a number." State's
Brief at pp. 9, 11. Huckabay neither said nor implied that zero is not a number. Not all numbers
are created equal, however. Zero is not a "thing," but rather the absence of a thing. MerriamWebster defines "zero" as follows: "the arithmetical symbol O ... denoting the absence of all
magnitude or quantity" and "the number between the set of all negative numbers and the set of
all positive numbers." Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.). Citing two U.S.
Supreme Court cases, the State acknowledges that the meaning of a word in a statute depends on
the context in which the word is used. State's Brief at p. 12. This Court likewise recently
reaffirmed that, when engaging in statutory interpretation, "[p ]rovisions should not be read in
isolation, but rather within the context of the entire document." State v. Smalley, 164 Idaho 780,
784,435 P.3d 1100, 1104 (2019). LC. § 36-1401(c)(3) exists to protect actual animals, birds and
fish, not negative numbers of wildlife or an absence of wildlife. The context of "combination" in
LC. § 36-1401(c)(3) is the act of combining two or more animals, birds or fish that actually exist.

felony conviction also has collateral consequences. See LC. § 18-310.
2

Similarly, the Cambridge English Dictionary defines "combination" as "a mixture obtained
when two or more things are combined."
3

This definition is no longer available at this web address; however, it can be obtained at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/combination.
-4-

In a misplaced effort to “bolster” its position, the State cites four federal appellate
decisions that interpreted a provision of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to permit an
“additional fine” to recover the costs of incarceration and/or supervision even though the district
court did not impose a punitive fine. State’s Brief at p. 9. Those circuit courts reasoned that zero
can be a number for the punitive fine that provides a predicate for the real additional fine. See
United States v. Aguilera, 48 F.3d 327, 329 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 837 (1995); United
States v. Sellers, 42 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 826 (1995); United
States v. Favorito, 5 F.3d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1006 (1994); United
States v. Turner, 998 F.2d 534, 538 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1026 (1993). This line of
cases actually backfires on the State’s argument that the federal cases bolster the conclusion that
I.C. § 36-1401(c)(3) is unambiguous because the State omitted from its presentation the fact that
an equal number of federal circuit cases reached the opposite conclusion when interpreting
“additional fine.” See United States v. Norman, 3 F.3d 368, 369-70 (11th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1131 (1994); United States v. Pineda, 981 F.2d 569, 576 (1st Cir. 1992)
(relying on United States v. Corral, 964 F.2d 83, 84 (1st Cir. 1992)); United States v. Fair, 979
F.2d 1037, 1042 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Labat, 915 F.2d 603, 607 (10th Cir. 1990).
The Tenth Circuit in Labat reasoned that “simple logic and a plain reading of the
language” of the Sentencing Guideline provision precluded the imposition of an “additional fine”
to recover the costs of incarceration when the district court waived a punitive fine upon finding
that the defendant was indigent. Id. Citing the definition of “additional” in Webster’s Third
International Dictionary, the circuit court continued that “fundamental semantics dictates that a
subparagraph (i) fine cannot be ‘additional,’ unless it augments another fine.” Id. & n.6.
-5-

Even in United States v. Aguilera, a case on which the State relies, the panel of judges
split. In the dissenting portion of his separate opinion in United States v. Aguilera, distinguished
Senior Circuit Judge John Godbold noted "the irony that this court says its view is the 'common
sense' conclusion, while Labat thought the contrary view was 'simple logic' .... It is suggested
that a putative fine of zero dollars, which, of course, is not a fine, supports an 'additional' fine
because additional means adding two numbers together and zero is a number." 48 F.3d at 331.
As Judge Godbold observed, zero is a number but zero dollars does not qualify as a real fine.
Similarly, zero is a number, but zero or non-existent wildlife plus a single moose does not qualify
as a tangible combination of animals, birds or fish. 4 The State's theory that "zero plus one equals
one" constitutes a "combination", State's Brief at p. 9, conflicts with logic and the plain, ordinary
and accepted meaning of the word "combination." This Court has reiterated that "'[w]hen
construing a statute, the words used must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and
the statute must be construed as a whole."' Montalbano v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical

Center, 151 Idaho 837, 840, 264 P.3d 944, 947 (2011) (quoting City ofHuetter v. Keene, 150
Idaho 13, 15,244 P.3d 157, 159 (2010)). The clause "any combination of numbers or species"
is disregarded if unlawful possession of a single animal qualifies as a felony. 5
Huckabay' s Opening Brief explained that the legislature selected the phrase "any

4

The State cites two other cases for the non-controversial proposition that zero is a number.
State's Brief at p. 10. Those two cases do not have any application to the analysis of LC. § 361401(c)(3) beyond stating that zero is a number. See Memorial Hospital of Laramie County v.
Healthcare Realty Trust, Inc., 509 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2007), and Farmers Insurance Company v.
Tallsalt, 192 Ariz. 129, 962 P.2d 203 (1998).
5

The legislature made the unlawful possession of a single moose a misdemeanor and
explicitly provided a penalty for the offense. See LC. § 36-502(b ); LC. § 36-1402(c).
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combination of numbers or species,” to mean multiple wildlife and used the phrase “one (1) or
more” elsewhere in Title 36 when a single item would satisfy the statute. See I.C. § 36-111(c), §
36-406(g), § 36-1101(b)(1), § 36-2002, § 36-2302. Appellant’s Opening Brief at pp. 6-7.
Rather than addressing the legislature’s use of the phrase “one (1) or more” in other sections of
Title 36, the State labeled Huckabay’s point as “guesswork” and summarily dismissed
Huckabay’s references to other provisions of Title 36 because “Section 36-1401(c)(3) is plain on
its face” so a court “should not be construing” the statute’s “plain text based on other statutory
language.” State’s Brief at p. 11. Essentially, the State is asserting that its interpretation of
“combination,” even as it conflicts with the dictionary definition, is so obviously correct this
Court should put on blinders to avoid seeing the “one (1) or more” language that the legislature
used in other provisions of Title 36 when describing more simply and clearly the State’s scenario
of zero plus one. According to the State, no need exists for any analysis so long as this Court
disregards the dictionary definition of “combination” and ignores the word.
Huckabay is not arguing that this Court must use the language of other sections to
interpret the language in I.C. § 36-1401(c)(3), but this Court should read related statutes in para
materia. See State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689-90, 85 P.3d 656, 665-66 (2004). Huckabay
simply is observing that in plain, common usage “any combination of numbers” and “one (1) or
more” are not synonymous. The legislature used the phrase “combination of numbers or
species,” consistent with the dictionary definition of “combination,” in Section 36-1401(c)(3) to
require multiple actual wildlife and used the phrase “one (1) or more” elsewhere in Title 36 to
describe the situation when a single item satisfies the statute. The absence in Section 361401(c)(3) of the modifier “one (1) or more” directly supports the conclusion that the word
-7-

"combination" should be read using its commonly understood meaning of combining two or
more things. If the legislature had intended to make unlawfully killing, possessing or wasting a
single animal a felony, it would have written: "Unlawfully killing, possessing or wasting one (1)
or more animals or species of wildlife within a twelve (12) month period which has a single or
combined reimbursable damage assessment of more than one thousand dollars ($1,000)."6
The State counters that Huckabay' s interpretation of "any combination of numbers and
species" cannot be correct because he "turns a blind eye" to the subsequent phrase "single or
combined reimbursable damage assessment." State's Brief at pp. 10-11. This subsequent phrase
actually causes difficulty for the State, rather than for Huckabay, for two reasons. First, under the
State's theory that zero wildlife plus one moose can constitute a "combination of numbers or
species," the words "single or" are superfluous or confusing because the word "combined" can
encompass the scenario of zero wildlife plus a single animal. If the State gives effect to every
word, to include "single ... reimbursable damage assessment," the State is in the awkward
position of interpreting the word "combined" to exclude a single animal while interpreting the
word "combination" to include a single animal. In Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex

rel. Hunt, 587 U.S._, 139 S.Ct. 1507, 1512 (2019), the U.S. Supreme Court explained that
except in "the most unusual situations, a single use of a statutory phrase must have a fixed
meaning. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994). We therefore avoid
interpretations that would 'attribute different meanings to the same phrase.' Reno v. Bossier

Parish School Board, 528 U.S. 320, 329 (2000)." (Parallel citations omitted). Accord, United

6

Interestingly, the legislature used the phrase "three (3) or more violations" in the next
subsection, LC. § 36-1401 (c)(4 ), when creating a felony to punish repeat offenders within a ten-year
period.
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States v. Davis, 588 U.S. ___ , 139 S.Ct. at 2328.
Second, the State draws an unwarranted inference from the word “single” in connection
with the reimbursable damage assessment in Section 36-1401(c)(3). Specifically, the State
misunderstands the relationship between the phrase “single or combined reimbursable damage
assessment” and the phrase “combination of numbers or species of wildlife within a twelve (12)
month period.” In order to meet the threshold for a felony, Section 36-1401(c)(3) requires at
least one violation involving at least one animal or other wildlife for which the legislature has
established a reimbursable damage assessment of more than $1,000. Not all wildlife have an
associated reimbursable damage assessment. I.C. § 36-202(g) defines “wildlife” as “any form of
animal life, native or exotic, generally living in a state of nature provided that domestic cervidae
as defined in section 25-3701, Idaho Code, shall not be classified as wildlife.” The subset of
wildlife for which the legislature designated a reimbursable damage assessment in I.C. § 361404(a) is more narrow. A person can commit a felony pursuant to Section 36-1401(c)(3),
however, by unlawfully killing, possessing or wasting a single moose and unlawfully killing,
possessing or wasting a second animal or other wildlife that lacks an associated damage
assessment within twelve months of committing the violation involving the moose. The two
clauses refer to different requirements. The initial clause – “combination of numbers or species”
– requires at least two animals or two species. The second clause – “single or combined” –
requires that at least one of those animals or species has an associated damage assessment that
either by itself or when combined with the other animal or species exceeds $1,000.
Contrary to the State’s contention, Huckabay did not turn a blind eye to the word “single”
in I.C. § 36-1401(c)(3). The phrase “single or” in the later clause in Section 36-1401(c)(3) is
-9-

entirely consistent with Huckabay’s interpretation of “any combination of numbers or species.”
This phrase does create an internal inconsistency under the State’s theory, however, when
applying the dictionary definition of combination and combined. As the next section will
address, a significant number of officers at the enforcement level of the Idaho Department of Fish
and Game (“Fish and Game”) have applied Section 36-1401(c)(3) consistent with Huckabay’s
interpretation that a felony requires two or more animals or other wildlife and that a single
moose, standing alone, qualifies only for a misdemeanor.
The State argues the presence of the word “single” in Section 36-1401(c)(3) indicates the
legislature intended that possession of one animal with a “single or combined reimbursable
damage assessment of more than one thousand dollars ($1,000)” would violate the statute
resulting in a felony. This argument would not have worked in 1992 when Section 36-1401(c)(3)
was enacted because there was no “single” animal with a reimbursable damage assessment of
more than $1,000. See R., p. 79. The argument also does not work when all of the words within
the statute are given effect. The use of the word “single” serves a completely different purpose
than the phrase “any combination of numbers or species.” As the legislative history shows,
Section 36-1401(c)(3) is intended to punish an offender who repeatedly violates the law. See
Appellant’s Opening Brief at pp. 12-14.
Prior to 1992, felony violations occurred when any individual pleaded guilty to or was
found guilty of two (2) or more violations within five (5) years. See R., p. 61. When Section
36-1401(c)(3) was enacted in 1992, I.C. § 36-1404 provided a damage assessment for
approximately eleven animals total. R., p. 79. Thus, most wildlife had no damage assessment.
The word “single” was intended to make clear that a felony could occur when a single animal
-10-

with a reimbursable damage assessment over the threshold was unlawfully killed, possessed or
wasted in conjunction with a second animal or other wildlife that was not listed in Section 361404 being unlawfully killed, possessed or wasted. 7 In effect, and as previously argued, it would
have taken two animals with reimbursable damage assessments to exceed the $1,000 threshold in
1992, but the legislature was placing an emphasis on what types of animals were being killed,
possessed, or wasted by focusing on the value of these animals.
Establishing a felony charge, Section 36-1401(c)(3) always has been a multiple violation
offense and that remains true today. Although the legislature has added numerous additional
animals to the list of animals with a reimbursable damage assessment in Section 36-1404(a), a
significant number of animals still are not on the list. Predatory wildlife as defined in IDAPA
13.01.06.104, and LC. § 36-201, which includes coyotes, jackrabbits, raccoons and other
animals, can be unlawfully killed and possessed and yet they do not have a damage assessment.
For example, killing predatory wildlife while using a spotlight or artificial light is unlawful under
LC. § 36-1101 when it is not done on one's own property. Thus, a person who kills or possesses
predatory wildlife through use of a spotlight and then within the next 12 months kills, possesses
or wastes another animal with a reimbursable damage assessment exceeding $1,000 will have
committed a violation of LC.§ 36-1401(c)(3). In this way, all of the elements of Section 361401(c)(3) are met: there is a combination of numbers with the two animals, it occurred within a
12-month period, and the single or combined reimbursable damage assessment exceeds the

7

Five years later, when the legislature amended LC. § 36-1401(c)(3) to add the phrase
"within a twelve (12) month period", the word "single" covered the scenario where a single animal
with a reimbursable damage assessment over the felony threshold was unlawfully killed, possessed
or wasted within tweleve (12) months of a second animal or other wildlife that was not listed in
Section 36-1404 being unlawfully killed, possessed or wasted. See R., pp. 67-72.
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$1,000 threshold.
Arguing in the alternative, the State claims that even ifl.C. § 36-1401(c)(3) is ambiguous,
the Court should adopt the most reasonable construction of the language in the statute. State's
Brief at p. 12. In the case of an ambiguous criminal statute, however, the doctrine oflenity
applies and the statute must be construed in favor of Huckabay. See State v. Martinez, 126
Idaho 801, 803, 891 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Ct. App.1995). Ambiguity in the statute means it takes
more than a single cow moose to satisfy Section 36-1401(c)(3). Additionally, several indications
exist, including statutory provisions, that the legislature did not intend to make the possession of
a single moose a felony. Those indications are discussed in detail in Huckabay' s opening brief.
See Appellant's Opening Brief at pp. 9-15.

The State also argues there is no indication the legislature did not know the increase in
the reimbursable damage limit made the unlawful possession of a moose a felony. State's Brief
at p. 12. In the absence of any indication, the presumption is the legislature did not intend to
change the law. "The legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn long established principles
of law unless an intention to do so plainly appears by express declaration or the language
employed admits ofno other reasonable construction." McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228,236,
61 P.3d 585, 593 (2002). 8
The State entirely misses the import of the fact that LC. § 36-1402(c) establishes a

8

The State points to a comment made by a single legislator that LC.§ 36-1401(c)(3) should
be amended to make killing a moose a misdemeanor. State's Brief at p. 13. The law was never
amended. The statement by the legislator is of no use here because it is impossible to draw any
meaningful conclusion from what occurred. Perhaps the law was not changed because reassurances
were given that killing a moose already was a misdemeanor. Perhaps there was significant
disagreement about what the statute meant. In the end, the most one can conclude is it is unclear
why the issue was raised and why nothing was done in response to the concern.
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minimum $500 fine for a misdemeanor offense involving a moose, arguing the statute also
includes the phrase "except in cases where a higher penalty is prescribed." State's Brief at p. 13.
The critical fact is the statute specifically establishes a minimum fine under Title 36 for a
misdemeanor violation involving a moose. The heading of Section 36-1402(c) is "Misdemeanor
Penalty." If every killing or possession of a moose is a felony, as the State asserts and the district
court found, there would be no need for a misdemeanor fine.
If the legislature had intended the unlawful killing or possession of a lone moose to

constitute a felony, the legislature could have deleted moose, mountain goats and big horn sheep
from the animals subject to a misdemeanor penalty under LC. § 36-1402(c). Moreover, in 2006,
the legislature amended LC. § 36-1406 to extend the misdemeanor statute of limitations for
unlawfully taking (killing) or possessing "any big game animal" to five years. (Emphasis added.)
Appellant's Opening Brief, Addendum ("Add.") p. 30. The legislature did not provide that the
misdemeanor statute of limitations applied to any big game animal except those with
reimbursable values of $1,000 or more. Instead, the legislature wrote "any big game animal."
LC.§ 36-1402(c) and IDAPA 13.01.06.100 include several animals with a reimbursable damage

value that the legislature had increased to $1,500 in 1999. R., pp. 81-83. The legislature
certainly would not have increased the misdemeanor statute of limitations for "any big game
animal" if killing or possessing one of several species of big game animal always constitutes a
felony. 9

9

The district court rejected this argument on the ground that LC. § 36-1406 uses the phrase
"for unlawfully taking or possessing any big game animal .... " In the district court's view, "[i]t is
possible to take (hunt) for a moose with a spotlight and that crime is a misdemeanor, and therefore
the misdemeanor statute oflimitations would apply to that crime." R., p. 401. This narrow example
would only apply under the district court's analysis where the hunt with the spotlight was
-13-

If the phrase "any big game animal" is given its ordinary meaning and if effect is given to
all the words of the statute, the legislature certainly intended the act of unlawfully killing or
possessing a single big game animal, including a moose, to constitute a misdemeanor. Any other
interpretation improperly renders the words "any big game animal" void or superfluous or
misleading. See State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007).
LC.§ 36-1401(c)(3) can only be viewed as unambiguous if meaning is given to each of
the words in the statute including the word combination. The dictionary definition and
commonly accepted meaning of"combination" as the act of merging or joining two or more
actual things; the fact that the legislature did not include the phrase "one (1) or more" in this
subsection of Title 36 even though the legislature used the phrase elsewhere in Title 36 and a
parallel phrase in Section 36-1401(c)(4); that the legislature enacted a misdemeanor violation
that encopasses the unlawful killing or taking of a single moose; and that the legislature enacted a
minimum fine of $500 for a misdemeanor offense involving a moose; all combine to support
Huckabay' s interpretation. This Court should conclude that no ambiguity exists because "any
combination of numbers or species" requires multiple wildlife. The district court failed to apply
the plain and usual meaning of the words "combination" and "numbers," which resulted in the
court committing error by denying the motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because Section
36-1401 (c)(3) does not encompass the unlawful possession of a single moose.

unsuccessful. Otherwise, the moose would be killed and possessed, which the court determined
always is a felony. Subsection 36-202(i) also includes in the definition of "take" to "kill, possess
or any attempt to do so." Section 36-1406 includes the phrase "possessing any big game animal,"
which is what the Second Amended Indictment charged. The district court's conclusion that the
legislature did not envision the misdemeanor statute of limitations applying to the unlawful
possession of a single moose is inconsistent with a fair reading of the statute.
-14-

2. Fish and Game Enforcement Records Conflict With Interpretation of District
Court and Show I.C. § 36-1401(c)(3) is Void-for-Vagueness as Applied to Huckabay
(i) Enforcement Records Reflect Single Moose Charged as Misdemeanor

Huckabay presented records to the district court from Fish and Game listing all Title 36
violations between 1999 and 2016 involving a moose. R., pp. 217-222, 252-262. These records
reflect that Fish and Game pursued a felony charge in only 35 of the 238 criminal cases. R., pp.
252-262; See Appellant's Opening Brief, Add., pp. 1-11 for highlighted felony charges.
Moreover, Fish and Game chose to use the phrase "two or more big game" in each instance
where a felony was charged under I.C. § 36-1401(c)(3). Id. The remaining 203 charges that
involved a moose were misdemeanors. R., pp. 252-270, 327-365. 10
The State attempts to dismiss Huckabay's reliance on the pattern that Fish and Game
enforcement records establish by arguing that the records "tell us nothing," but if they do tell us
something, this Court should ignore them because an executive agency "should not dictate how
this Court construes statutes." State's Brief at pp. 14-16. In support of this misguided argument,
the State cites Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876,885,499 P.2d
575, 584 (1972), a condemnation case, for the inapplicable proposition that the legislature cannot
delegate the power to create laws to administrative agencies. Huckabay did not make a contrary
assertion or contend that Fish and Game has defined the terms of the statute. Instead, Huckabay
asks this Court to draw two conclusions from the enforcement pattern that the records reveal: (1)

10

Huckabay also submitted court records from Kootenai County showing that Fish and
Game violations involving a moose usually were charged as a misdemeanor rather than as a felony
under I.C. § 36-1401(c)(3). R., pp. 263-270, 327-365. The position of the district court and the
State, that the statute unambiguously provides that all violations involving the unlawful killing or
possession of a single moose are felonies, is not consistent with the court records, which reflect that
magistrates presided over most offenses involving moose.
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reasonable, trained people can and do read Section 36-1401 (c)(3) as requiring a violation to
encompass multiple wildlife to meet the threshold for a felony and those trained officers pursue a
misdemeanor charge of "taking" when a single moose is involved and (2) Huckabay' s right to
due process was violated by prosecuting and sentencing him for a felony when many other
similarly situated defendants faced only a misdemeanor.

(ii) Pattern Shown by Enforcement Records is Valid and Relevant
First, the fact that the Fish and Game personnel who enforce Idaho's wildlife statutes
overwhelmingly only pursue a felony charge pursuant to LC. § 36-1401(c)(3) when the offense
involves two or more moose or other wildlife, and pursue a misdemeanor charge when the
offense involves a single moose, provides persuasive evidence that the district court and the State
are mistaken in asserting that Section 36-1401(c)(3) states unambiguously that an offense
involving a single moose is a felony. 11 Applying logic and common sense, one would expect a
substantial percentage of the offenses involving a single moose to be charged as a felony if Fish
and Game personnel read the plain language of Section 36-1401 (c)(3) as unambiguously
providing that the unlawful possession of a single moose "is always a felony." R., p. 393. Given
that the strong pattern instead establishes that offenses involving a single moose typically are

11

The district court did not dispute the accuracy of Huckabay' s evidence, but instead
responded that LC.§ 36-1401(c)(3) "is not vague despite Defendant's attempt to sow confusion or
Idaho Department of Fish and Game misapplying the clear law they are charged with enforcing." R.,
p. 403. The characterization that Huckabay was sowing confusion rather than advancing an
argument based on strong evidence is unfair when the vast majority of violations involving a single
moose have been misdemeanors and Fish and Game's records reveal that the felonies involved
multiple animals. The district court accused Fish and Game of consistently "misapplying the clear
law," surmising that "game wardens were unlawfully lenient or failed to read the statutes they were
supposed to enforce." Id. Given the overwhelming percentage of misdemeanor charges in
comparison to felony charges, a fairer conclusion is that many Fish and Game officers read Section
36-1401(c)(3) as applying only to violations that involve two or more moose.
-16-

charged as a misdemeanor and offenses involving multiple moose typically are charged as a
felony, the enforcement records show either that Huckabay is correct that Section 36-1401 (c)(3)
unambiguously does not encompass an offense involving a single moose or that Section 361401(c)(3) is ambiguous.
The State counters that Huckabay' s pattern arises from an "apples-to-oranges
comparison" because the bulk of the "misdemeanors in the enforcement records involve 'takings'
of wildlife," which is a term that is more broadly defined in LC. § 36-202(i) than the phrase
"unlawfully killing, possessing or wasting" that appears in LC. § 36-1401(c)(3). State's Brief at
p. 15. According to the State, Huckabay' s pattern therefore is "uninformative" because "we have
no way of knowing how many of the moose cases ... that were charged as takings could have
been charged under Section 36-1401(c)(3)." Id. (Emphasis in original). This argument does not
explain, however, the following evidence: Fish and Game used the phrase "two or more big
game" in connection with each felony charged pursuant to Section 36-1401 (c)(3) and all
violations involving a single moose were charged as misdemeanors. Although some percentage
of the violations may have involved conduct that was encompassed only by the broader definition
of "take" as defined in LC. § 36-202(i), it is inconceivable that a significant number of the over
200 misdemeanor violations did not involve the unlawful "killing, possessing or wasting" of a
single moose. 12 Looking at the Kootenai County records only, at least fifteen ( 15) misdemeanor

12

Huckabay consistently has argued that the legislature relied on the broad conduct that the
definition of "take" describes in LC. § 36-202(i) to create in LC. § 36-502(b) the misdemeanor of
unlawful possession of wildlife or parts of wildlife that had been taken or killed unlawfully. which
would encompass the unlawful killing, possession or wasting of a single moose. The enforcement
scheme that the legislature enacted, as Huckabay reads the statutes, makes common sense and
addresses the possible range of offenses with proportionality. The legislature recognized that an
otherwise law-abiding person can make a mistake by taking a single animal or other form of wildlife
-17-

charges included the "killing, possessing, or wasting" language and thirteen ( 13) of those
misdemeanor charges used the words "killing, possessing, or wasting" and "unlawfully." R., p.
262-263. At a minimum, the enforcement records show that the statutory scheme is sufficiently
ambiguous to cause confusion among reasonable officers. The related statutes and the legislative
history ofl.C. § 36-1401(c)(3) support this conclusion. Appellant's Opening Brief at pp. 9-15.
(iii) Section 36-1401(c)(3) is Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied

Second, the enforcement pattern shows that the State treated Huckabay differently than
many other defendants in the same situation as him. The State attempts to sidestep the thrust of
Huckabay's void-for-vagueness argument by repeating that Section 36-1401(c)(3) is plain and
unambiguous; by suggesting that Huckabay' s conduct lies within the core of the statute's
prohibition; by questioning the relevance of the pattern; and by asserting that Huckabay has not
overcome the "strong presumption" of a statute's constitutionality. State's Brief at p. 17.
This Court recently reiterated that
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This doctrine requires that a
statute defining criminal conduct be worded with sufficient clarity and
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and
that the statute be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. Village ofHoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982). It is a basic principle of due process that an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.

unlawfully. Section 36-502(b) makes a person liable for a misdemeanor for the unlawful possession
of a single animal or parts of that animal. Section 36-1401(c)(3) makes a person liable for a felony
if the person commits violations within a twelve-month period involving two or more animals or
other forms of wildlife if the reimbursable damage assessment for one of those animals or other
forms of wildlife exceeds $1,000 or the combined reimbursable damage assessment for the two or
more forms of wildlife exceeds $1,000. Section 36-1401(c)(4) makes a person liable for a felony
if the person commits three violations, each of which has a penalty that included a mandatory license
revocation and/or a reimbursable damage assessment, within a ten-year period.
-18-

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Furthermore, as a matter of
due process, no one may be required at the peril of loss of liberty to speculate as to
the meaning of penal statutes. United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841, 847 n.4 (9th
Cir.1986), citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939), Smith v.
United States, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1032 (1987).
State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, 444 P.3d 877, 881 (2019) (parallel citations omitted) (quoting
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711-12, 69 P.3d 126, 131-32 (2003), abrogated on other grounds
by Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013)). Accord, State v. Knutsen, 158 Idaho 199, 202, 345
P.3d 989, 992 (2015). The Constitution of the State of Idaho and the United States Constitution
provide the same void-for-vagueness due process protections. State v. Lenz, 103 Idaho 632, 634,
651 P.2d 566, 568 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982).
Considering a vagueness challenge to a federal statute that created a mandatory,
consecutive prison term for using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in connection with certain
crimes, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that “[v]ague laws contravene the ‘first essential of due
process of law’ that statutes must give people ‘of common intelligence’ fair notice of what the
law demands of them.” United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. at ___ , 139 S.Ct. at 2325 (quoting
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). The Court further expressed
concern that “[v]ague statutes threaten to hand responsibility for defining crimes to relatively
unaccountable police, prosecutors, and judges, eroding the people’s ability to oversee the
creation of the laws they are expected to abide.” Id. Although acknowledging that it would be
possible for the Court to read the statute in a manner that would impose the additional penalty on
the defendants’ conduct, the majority held that
it’s impossible to say that Congress surely intended that result, or that the
law gave [the defendants] fair warning the § 924(c)’s mandatory penalties would
apply to their conduct. Respect for due process and the separation of powers
-19-

suggests a court may not, in order to save Congress the trouble of having to write
a new law, construe a criminal statute to penalize conduct it does not clearly
proscribe.
Employing the canon as the government wishes would also sit uneasily
with the rule of lenity' s teaching that ambiguities about the breadth of a criminal
statute should be resolved in the defendant's favor. That rule is "perhaps not
much less old than" the task of statutory "construction itself." United States v.
Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.). And much like the
vagueness doctrine, it is founded on "the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals" to fair notice of the law "and on the plain principle that the power of
punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department." Ibid.

United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. at_, 139 S.Ct. at 2333 (emphasis in original).
The Fish and Game enforcement records and the Kootenai County court records establish
that trained law enforcement officers, let alone ordinary people, have a misunderstanding (from
the perspective of the State's interpretation) about the scope of the conduct that Section 361401(c)(3) addresses. Although the State attempts to challenge the validity of the pattern of
historical Fish and Game enforcement through an assertion that many of the violations involve
"'takings"' that "are not necessarily under the ambit of Section 36-1401(c)(3)," State's Brief at p.
17, 13 the State has no answer to the undisputed fact that Fish and Game noted "two or more big
game" in connection with each of the felony prosecutions. Flipping the State's assertion around,
a material number of the over 200 misdemeanor violations undoubtedly involved the unlawful
killing, possession, or wasting of a moose. In fact, the Kootenai County court records reflect that
thirteen (13) of the misdemeanor charges included the following words that also appear in I.C. §
36-1401(c)(3): "unlawfully'' and "killing, possessing or wasting." R., p. 262-263. Both the

13

The State does not support its assertion by providing the Court with any sort of analysis
of the enforcement records to indicate how many of the misdemeanors involved conduct that fell
within the broad definition of"take" in I.C. § 36-202(i) but would not have satisfied the still quite
broad prohibition of "unlawfully killing, possessing or wasting" a moose in I.C. § 36-1401(c)(3).
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felony and the misdemeanor records support Huckabay’s contention that, unlike his case, Fish
and Game has not pursued a felony charge when the violation has involved a single moose.
Section 36-1401(c)(3) definitely is not unambiguous in the way the State reads it. Moreover,
given the manner in which Fish and Game officers have applied the felony statute in the field, a
reasonable, ordinary person cannot be expected to conclude that the unlawful possession of a
single moose, standing alone, constitutes a felony.
The State’s suggestion that Huckabay cannot invoke the void-for-vagueness doctrine
because his conduct lies within the core of the statute’s proscription makes no sense. State’s
Brief at p. 17. Huckabay contends that Section 36-1401(c)(3) is void-for-vagueness as applied
to him. The State contends, and the district court ruled, that the language of the statute
encompasses the unlawful possession of a single moose. Huckabay contends that the language
requires at least two animals or species to satisfy the felony threshold. A dispute exists as to the
definition of the core. This is a critical distinction between Huckabay’s situation and the
defendant in State v. Knutsen, where this Court stated: “A criminal defendant that engages in
conduct that is clearly proscribed by the statute cannot complain that it may be vague as applied
to the conduct of others.” 158 Idaho at 203, 345 P.3d at 993. Huckabay is challenging only the
State’s effort to apply the statute to his conduct of unlawfully possessing a single moose.
This Court has explained that
[t]o succeed on an “as applied” vagueness challenge, a complainant must show
that the statute, as applied to the defendant’s conduct, failed to provide fair notice
that the defendant’s conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient
guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to
arrest him [or her].
State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, ___, 444 P.3d at 882 (quoting, State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712,
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69 P.3d at 132. When evaluating the fairness of the notice to a defendant in response to a vague
as applied challenge, this Court uses “the ‘ordinary people’ standard.” State v. Cook, 165 Idaho
305, ___, 444 P.3d at 882 n.2.
No better evidence exists the statute fails to give notice and leaves room for arbitrary
prosecution as it was applied to Huckabay than the fact the Second Amended Indictment and the
jury instructions omitted the pertinent statutory language that the State asserts is unambiguous
and clearly encompasses Huckabay’s conduct. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at pp. 18-21, 4142. The district court candidly and correctly ruled the use of the statutory language would
confuse a jury of Huckabay’s peers and, by extension, Huckabay himself. R., p. 547; Tr. p. 445.
This is not a case where the due process violation was either theoretical or remote. An
unambiguous criminal statute does not confuse a jury.
The State asserts that Huckabay has not overcome the “strong presumption” of the
statute’s constitutionality. State’s Brief at p. 17. Although a legislative enactment does carry a
strong presumption of validity, this Court repeatedly has clarified that “‘[a] void for vagueness
challenge is more favorably acknowledged and a more stringent vagueness test will be applied
where a statute imposes a criminal penalty . . . .’” State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, ___, 444 P.3d at
881 (quoting State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 198, 969 P.2d 244, 247 (1998). Accord, State v.
Prather, 135 Idaho 770, 773, 25 P.3d 83, 86 (2001). Not only did Huckabay face a criminal
penalty, but he sustained a felony conviction and served thirty days’ incarceration. Reasonable
ordinary people, trained law enforcement officers and legal professionals can read I.C. § 361401(c)(3) different ways. The State and Huckabay both contend that Section 36-1401(c)(3) is
unambiguous, but each provides a very different “plain” interpretation. Fish and Game officers
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consistently have pursued a felony charge only when the violation involved "two or more big
game." Records from Fish and Game and the Kootenai County court system reflect that a
misdemeanor usually is charged when the violation involves a single moose. This enforcement
pattern, together with the different interpretations of Section 36-1401 (c)(3), do enable Huckabay
to overcome the strong presumption that the statute is constitutional as applied to his conduct.

B. State Failed to Allege and Prove That Huckabay Acted With Scienter
Huckabay contends that the State violated his right to due process by improperly failing
to allege in the Second Amended Indictment any criminal knowledge or mens rea that Huckabay
was aware that he had possession of a wild animal in an unlawful manner. Appellant's Opening
Brief at pp. 26-32. Carrying that contention through the case, Huckabay likewise asserts that the
State failed to prove a violation ofl.C. § 36-1401(c)(3) because the State did not prove he
possessed the moose knowing that his associate 14 lacked a valid tag, that it was a closed season
for cow moose, or that the moose was taken or killed by an unauthorized method. 15 Id. at pp. 2631. Finally, Huckabay objected that the district court failed to instruct the jury that the State was
required to prove scienter as an element of the offense. Id. at p. 43.
The State responded flippantly that Huckabay's guilty knowledge argument "can be
quickly dispatched." State's Brief at p. 27. According to the State, Section 36-1401(c)(3) does
not require a knowledge element. ... It simply criminalizes ' [u ]nlawfully killing, possession or

14

Robert "Bob" Cushman, an experienced butcher, had the moose hanging on the back of
his truck and in his refrigerated locker at his butcher facility. Tr. pp. 203-203, 249-253, 256. He was
in the driver's seat when a couple observed the moose on the truck's lift apparatus. Tr. pp. 205-206.
Huckabay said: "Yes, we have a tag." Tr. p. 213.
15

Examples of an unauthorized method would include hunting a moose from a motorized
vehicle or hunting a moose with the aid of a spotlight or other artificial light. I. C. § 1101 (b )( 1), (6).
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wasting' certain wildlife, full stop." State's Brief at pp. 27, 43. Reinforcing this definitive
statement, the State contends that "because Section 36-1404(3)(c) 'does not expressly require any
mental element,' it only requires 'the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance' - in
this case, the moose." State's Brief at p. 28 16 (quoting State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 7,333 P.3d
112, 118 (2014)).
The State's extreme position has at least three serious problems that together invalidate it.
First, this Court's opinion in Goggin addressed an appeal from convictions for conspiracy to
manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance, delivery of a
controlled substance, and two charges involving drug paraphernalia. Id. at 3, 333 P.3d at 114.
According to the State, a general intent crime only requires that the defendant have possession of
the controlled substance. State's Brief at p. 28. The important point that the State omitted,
however, is that the defendant must know the identity of the substance, that is, the State must
prove that the defendant knew that he or she was possessing some type of controlled substance.
In State v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 356 P.3d 368 (2015), this Court explained that
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver pursuant to Idaho
Code section 37-2732(a)(l)(B) "does not expressly require a mental element. ... "
Goggin, 157 Idaho at 7, 333 P.3d at 118. Rather, it is a general intent crime. Id.;
see also State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993). "'[T]he
intent required by LC. § 18-114 is not the intent to commit a crime, but is merely
the intent to knowingly perform' the prohibited act." Goggin, 157 Idaho at 7, 333
P.3d at 118 (quoting Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183). "[D]elivery under
section 37-2732(a) only requires the knowledge that one is delivering the
substance." Id. "This knowledge element requires that the defendant know the
identity of the substance," id.; or believe it to be another controlled substance.
State v. Amelia, 144 Idaho 332, 334-35, 160 P.3d 771, 773-74 (Ct. App. 2007).

16

The citation by the State to Section 36-1404(3)(c) undoubtedly is a typographical error,
with the applicable statute being Section 36-1401(c)(3).
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159 Idaho at 82, 356 P.3d at 375.
The defendant in McKean raised a mistake of fact defense relying on I.C. § 18-201, which
provides that a person was not capable of committing a crime if that person “committed the act
or made the omission charged, through misfortune or accident, when it appears that there was not
evil design, intention or culpable negligence.” This Court confirmed that a “defendant’s
ignorance of the identity of a substance would be a defense to a charge of possession of a
controlled substance. Goggin, 157 Idaho at 7, 333 P.3d at 118. For example, if a defendant
believed ‘a powdery substance in a package’ was sugar instead of methamphetamine, then the
defendant would not be guilty of possession of methamphetamine. Id. (citing State v. Armstrong,
142 Idaho 62, 65, 122 P.2d 321, 324 (Ct. App. 2005).” 159 Idaho at 82, 356 P.3d at 375. As this
Court noted, however, “‘[i]gnorance of the law is not a defense.’” Id. (quoting State v. Fox, 124
Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183).
Second, knowing possession of a controlled substance such as cocaine, methamphetamine
or heroin is illegal. Possession of a moose, however, is not necessarily illegal. The U.S.
Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Rehaif, 588 U.S. ___ , 139 S.Ct. 2191
(2019), illustrates the importance of this distinction. Reversing a conviction for alien unlawfully
in the United States in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5)(A),
924(a)(2), the Supreme Court observed that
the possession of a gun can be entirely innocent. See Staples [v. United States ,
511 U.S. 600, 611 (1994)]. It is therefore the defendant’s status, and not his
conduct alone, that makes the difference. Without knowledge of that status, the
defendant may well lack the intent needed to make his behavior wrongful. His
behavior may instead be an innocent mistake to which criminal sanctions
normally do not attach. Cf. O. Holmes, The Common Law 3 (1881) (“even a dog
distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.”)
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United States v. Rehaif, 588 U.S. at ___ , 139 S.Ct. at 2197, 2200 (emphasis in original).
Defendant Hamid Rehaif had “entered the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa.”
Id. at ___, 139 S.Ct. at 2194. Poor academic performance resulted in Mr. Rehaif’s dismissal
from the university, which informed “him that his ‘immigration status’ would be terminated
unless he transferred to a different university or left the country.” Id. Mr. Rehaif neither
transferred to another school nor departed the country. Id. He subsequently visited a firing range
and engaged in target practice with two firearms. Id. The government charged Mr. Rehaif with
possessing firearms as an alien unlawfully in the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
922(g)(5)(A), 924(a)(2). Id. The trial “judge instructed the jury (over Rehaif’s objection) that
the ‘United States is not required to prove’ that Rehaif ‘knew that he was illegally or unlawfully
in the’” country. Id. The jury found Mr. Rehaif guilty. Id. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed. Id. at ___, 139 S.Ct. at 2195.
Reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that the government must prove “that
the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he had the relevant status when
he possessed it.” Id. at ___, 139 S.Ct. at 2194. In explaining its analysis, the Supreme Court
noted that the word “knowingly” modifies the verb “violates” in Section 924(a)(2) “and its direct
object, which in this case is § 922(g). . . . “Jurisdictional element aside, . . .the text of § 922(g)
simply lists the elements that make a defendant’s behavior criminal. As ‘a matter of ordinary
English grammar,’ we normally read the statutory term ‘knowingly’ as applying to all the
subsequently listed elements of the crime.” Id. at ___, 139 S.Ct. at 2195-96 (quoting FloresFigueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 650 (2009)). The Supreme Court stated that
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when determining Congress’ intent, we start from a longstanding presumption,
traceable to the common law, that Congress intends to require a defendant to
possess a culpable mental state regarding “each of the statutory elements that
criminalizes otherwise innocent conduct.” United States v. X-Citement Video,
Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
256-258 (1952). We normally characterize this interpretive maxim as a
presumption in favor of “scienter,” by which we mean a presumption that criminal
statutes require the degree of knowledge sufficient to “mak[e] a person legally
responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1547 (10th ed. 2014).
We apply the presumption in favor of scienter even when Congress does
not specify any scienter in the statutory text. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 606. But
the presumption applies with equal or greater force when Congress includes a
general scienter provision in the statute itself.
588 U.S. at ___, 139 S.Ct. at 2195-96 (parallel citations omitted). The State conceded that
“[t]rue enough”, the legislature provided for a mens rea element in every criminal offense
through I.C. § 18-114. State’s Brief at p. 27.
Third, a person should not sustain a felony conviction without the jury concluding that the
person knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that he or she or the person’s associate had not
complied with the regulatory requirements for possession of a moose. The Supreme Court in
Rehaif explained that beyond the Court’s interpretation of the text of the firearms statutes, its
reading of the statutes was consistent with
a basic principle that underlies criminal law . . . . [T]he understanding that an
injury is criminal only if inflicted knowingly ‘is as universal and persistent in
mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.”
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250. Scienter requirements advance this basic principle of
criminal law by helping to “separate those who understand the wrongful nature of
their act from those who do not.” X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72-73, n.3.
The cases in which we have emphasized scienter’s importance in
separating wrongful from innocent acts are legion. We have interpreted statutes to
include a scienter requirement even where the statutory text is silent on the
question. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 605. And we have interpreted statutes to
include a scienter requirement even where “the most grammatical reading of the
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statute” does not support one. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 70.
588 U.S. at ___, 139 S.Ct. at 2196-97 (citations omitted & parallel citations omitted).
Acknowledging that exceptions exist to the presumption in favor of reading a scienter
requirement into a statute, the Supreme Court stated that it has “typically declined to apply the
presumption . . . in cases involving statutory provisions that form part of a ‘regulatory’ or ‘public
welfare’ program and carry only minor penalties.” Id. at ___, 139 S.Ct. at 2197 (quoting Staples
v. United States, 511 U.S at 606). The Supreme Court concluded, however, that these “firearms
provisions before us are not part of a regulatory or public welfare program, and they carry a
potential penalty of 10 years in prison that we have previously described as ‘harsh.’ X-Citement
Video, 513 U.S. at 72. Hence, this exception to the presumption in favor of scienter does not
apply.” 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S.Ct. at 2197.
In Haxforth v. State, 117 Idaho 189, 786 P.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1990), the Idaho Court of
Appeals employed the same analysis as the Supreme Court in Rehaif v. United States.
Reviewing a conviction for misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter involving ordinary negligence,
the Court of Appeals observed that courts in other jurisdictions
have distinguished between traditional common law offenses and ‘public welfare
offenses’ . . . . See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). Courts
have concluded that under certain circumstances, public welfare offenses, such as
traffic violations, need not contain a general criminal intent or criminal negligence
requirement in order to comply with the due process clause. Instead, the crimes
can be premised upon ordinary negligence, or in some instances, even strict
liability. See, e.g., Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1960). The
proposition which appears to emerge from these cases is that when a crime (a)
does not find its roots in the common law, (b) carries only a light penalty, (c) does
not gravely besmirch the offender’s character, and (d) embodies a rule of conduct
with which compliance can be reasonably expected, then the crime can be treated
as a public welfare offense requiring only ordinary negligence. Id. at 310.
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117 Idaho at 190-91, 786 P.2d at 581-82 (parallel citations omitted). Applying this test for
satisfying the due process standard, the Court of Appeals determined that regulating the operation
of motor vehicles does not have
roots in the common law. Traffic laws are enacted for the benefit of the traveling
public and it is reasonable to expect compliance with these laws. Moreover,
vehicular manslaughter under subsection (c), being a misdemeanor, carries a
relatively minor penalty. . . . A conviction under this statute . . . does not gravely
besmirch the defendant’s character. Therefore, . . . the misdemeanor form of
vehicular manslaughter . . . resembles more closely a public welfare offense, and
as such need not contain a criminal negligence requirement.
117 Idaho at 191, 786 P.2d at 582. Unlike the defendant in Haxforth, Huckabay was convicted
of a felony that carries a potential harsh penalty including incarceration in state prison and
significant collateral consequences involving the loss of civil rights. See I.C. § 18-112; I.C. § 18310. Under the analysis set forth in the Rehaif and Haxforth decisions, Huckabay should not
have been exposed to the harsh penalty and collateral consequences of a felony without the State
alleging and proving to a jury that Huckabay had scienter when he helped his associate load the
cow moose onto the associate’s truck to the extent that he knew, or was reckless in not knowing,
that the associate did not have a valid tag, the season for cow moose was closed, or that the
associate took the moose by an unauthorized method.
Huckabay directed this Court’s attention to the opinion in United States v. Wulff, 758
F.2d 1121, 1122 (6th Cir. 1985), in which the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an
indictment that had charged the defendant with a felony violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act (“MBTA”) because the statute did not require proof of scienter for a conviction. Appellant’s
Opening Brief at p. 30. The Sixth Circuit held that the absence of a scienter requirement violated
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment “because the felony penalty provision is severe
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and would result in irreparable damage to one's reputation" and "the crime is not one known to
the common law" so the courts could not read a scienter requirement into a silent statute. Id. at
1122, 1124. The "severe" maximum penalty was two years in prison and a $2,000 fine. 758
F.2d at 1122-23. Huckabay faced a much more severe maximum penalty of five years in prison
and a $50,000 fine. I.C. § 18-112. The Sixth Circuit contrasted its analysis of the felony
provision with a decision by another panel of the same court which affirmed a misdemeanor
MBTA conviction despite the absence of any scienter. 758 F.2d at 1124. Although noting that
"no evidence" was introduced indicating that the defendants knew at any time that they were
hunting on a baited field and acknowledging the "harsh rule," the other panel affirmed the
convictions because "the crime is a strict liability offense" carrying a maximum penalty of six
months in prison and a $500 fine. United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1103-05 (6th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985). 17 The following year, in response to the Wulff
decision, Congress amended the felony provision to include a scienter requirement by adding the
modifier "knowingly." United States v. Pitrone, 115 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997).
In Rehaif v. United States, the Supreme Court cited Liparota v. United States, 4 71 U.S.

419,425 (1985), as one of the cases in which the Court had "emphasized scienter's importance in
separating wrongful from innocent acts." 588 U.S. at_, 139 S.Ct. at 2196. The Supreme
Court's opinion in Liparota interpreted "knowingly" in a criminal statute involving food stamps

17

The two decisions by the Sixth Circuit were consistent with two decisions by the Idaho
Court of Appeals that affirmed misdemeanor convictions for possession of unlawfully taken elk in
violation of I.C. § 36-502(b) without proof that the defendants knew the wildlife were taken
unlawfully or possessed the wildlife with criminal intent. State v. Simpson, 13 7 Idaho 813, 817, 54
P.3d 456, 460 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Wimer, 118 Idaho 732, 737, 800 P.2d 128, 133 (Ct. App.
1990).
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to require mens rea to the extent that the defendant knew that he had acquired or possessed food
stamps through conduct that the statute or the administrative regulations did not authorize. 4 71
U.S. at 420-21, 424. Rejecting the dissent's contention that the majority was creating a mistake
of law defense, the Court explained that "[i]t is not a defense to a charge of receipt of stolen
goods that one did not know that such receipt was illegal, and it is not a defense to a charge of a §
2024(b)( 1) violation that one did not know that possessing food stamps in a manner unauthorized
by statute or regulations was illegal. It is, however, a defense to a charge of knowing receipt of
stolen goods that one did not know that the goods were stolen, just as it is a defense to a charge
of a§ 2024(b)(l) violation that one did not know that one's possession was unauthorized." 471
U.S. at 425 n.9.
Applying the three threads of scienter analysis to Huckabay, due process does not permit
Huckabay to be convicted of the felony of unlawful possession of wildlife in violation ofl.C. §
36-1401(c)(3) based solely on proof that Huckabay knew he was in actual or constructive
possession of a moose. 18 Ordinary negligence or strict liability is insufficient to support a felony
conviction. Instead, the State had to allege and prove that Huckabay knew, or was grossly
negligent in failing to discover, the fact that someone had taken or killed the moose during a
closed season, without a valid tag or by an unauthorized method before he received possession of
the animal. The State did not need to allege or prove, however, that Huckabay knew that it was

18

Over defense objection, the district court gave "the stock ICJI definition of possession"
that includes both actual and constructive possession. R., p. 661; Tr., pp. 442, L.3,- 443, L.9, 825,
Ls. 8-13. This instruction, in conjunction with the instruction on the essential elements, meant that
the jury only was required to find for conviction that Huckabay knew of the presence of the moose
and had physical control of the moose for a moment in time either actually or constructively. Tr. p.p.
446,448; Tr. pp. 824, L.21, - 825, L.13.
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illegal in Idaho to take or kill a wild animal during a closed season, without a valid tag or by an
unauthorized method.
C. The Charging Documents Were Fatally Deficient
1. The Indictments Are Deficient and Violated Due Process
The charging documents are insufficient because the indictments failed to impart
jurisdiction and failed to satisfy due process. Both are needed in order for the court to have
jurisdiction. State v. Schmierer, 159 Idaho 768, 367 P.3d 163, 165 (2016). The State’s argument
improperly implies that once an indictment states an offense occurred within the State of Idaho
no further jurisdictional analysis needed. State’s Brief at pp. 19-20. Even if the indictment
charges a crime in the State of Idaho, it must also allege sufficient information to satisfy due
process. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 758, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004); State v. Severson, 147
Idaho 694, 708, 215 P.3d 414, 428 (2009).
The indictments violated due process by ignoring the ruling in State v. Hughes, 161
Idaho 826, 832, 392 P.3d 4,10 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014) that: “In order to state the essential facts of
an I.C. § 36–1401(c)(3) violation, the prosecutor must allege the defendant unlawfully killed,
possessed, or wasted any combination of numbers or species of wildlife within a twelve-month
period with a single or combined reimbursable damage assessment of more than $1,000.”
The State erroneously relies on dictum in Hughes and argues the case is authority for the
proposition possession of a single animal satisfies the statute. State’s Brief at pp. 20-21. Any
rule of law in an opinion not necessary to decide the issue presented to the appellate court is
dictum that is not controlling. State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 74, 305 P.3d 513, 518 (2013).
The issues addressed in Hughes focused on the adequacy of the allegations in the
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information in that case, whether the facts alleged were sufficient to plead a charge, and as a
result, whether the court had jurisdiction. It is apparent from the opinion in Hughes the question
of whether or not a single animal is a felony under LC. § 36-1401(c)(3) was not an issue before
the appellate court. The court did not analyze or interpret the phrase "combination of numbers or
species" language and the outcome of the case did not depend it. The holding in Hughes and its
precedential value is "In order to state the essential facts of an LC. § 36-1401 (c)(3) violation, the
prosecutor must allege that the defendant unlawfully killed, possessed, or wasted any
combination of numbers or species .... " 161 Idaho 826, 832, 392 P.3d at 10.
The State's interpretation of Hughes, that a single animal alone would satisfy LC. § 361401 (c)(3) , also fails because according to the dicta in Hughes killing a single buck mule deer
would be a felony if it had been killed, possessed or wasted in conjunction with a violation of
LC. § 36-1402(e)(l-5). If Hughes stands for the position that a single animal is sufficient to
charge a felony under LC. § 36-1401(c)(3), that is only true when the information simultaneously
alleges that the defendant killed, possessed, or wasted an animal by one of the flagrant violations
enumerated in Section 36-1402(±)(1-5). 19 No flagrant violations were alleged against Huckabay.
Even under the State's interpretation of Hughes, the indictments against Huckabay still would be
jurisdictionally deficient for failing to also allege that Huckabay killed, possessed, or wasted the
moose by one of the flagrant acts enumerated in LC. § 36-1402(±)(1-5). The indictments were
jurisdictionally deficient because they failed to include the specific language required in Hughes
or because, under the State's theory of Hughes, it failed to allege flagrant violations. A failure to

19

Hughes was decided in 2014. In 2015, the legislature amended LC. § 36-1402, which
resulted in the flagrant violations being renumbered from subsection "e" to subsection "f'.
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allege facts that constitute a crime under the statute prevents the charging document from
providing the court with jurisdiction. See State v. Olin, 153 Idaho 891, 893-94, 292 P.3d 282,
284-85 (2013). Under either scenario, the district court lacked jurisdiction.
2. The Indictments Are Deficient Because They Omit Essential Facts
The Second Amended Indictment also did not indicate the essential facts giving rise to
the offense or the means by which Huckabay committed the alleged crime. Severson, 147 Idaho
708, 215 P.3d at 428. None of the indictments informed Huckabay about how the possession
was unlawful pursuant to I.C. § 502(b), which defines unlawful possession as a taking or killing
that is unlawful. I.C. § 36- 202(i) reads: “Take means hunt, pursue, catch, capture, shoot, fish,
seine, trap, kill, or possess or any attempt to so do.”
The State argues Huckabay is engrafting a taking or killing element into the statute.
State’s Brief at p. 25. I.C. § 36- 502(b) defines “Unlawful possession” and that definition must
be uniformly applied in the statutory scheme to avoid absurd results. The State claims I.C. § 36502(b) merely creates a separate offense for unlawful possession. If that was true mere
possession would be all that is needed to commit a felony under I.C. § 36-1401(c)(3) while the
State would have to prove an unlawful killing or taking to commit the misdemeanor the State
contends I.C. § 36- 502(b) creates. That makes no sense. There is no reason it should be easier
to prove a felony than a misdemeanor.
Alleging and proving a taking is essential to avoid making benign conduct unlawful. It is
not criminal for a person without a tag to move a dead moose off of a highway after it is killed
unintentionally by a car because no taking occurred.
The series of indictments also eliminated several factual allegations as the trial
-34-

approached with the Second Amended Indictment coming days before trial. These amendments
provided less and less information to Huckabay about how the State contended he committed the
crime. The amended indictments where not issued by the grand jury. Because the amended
indictments also were so far removed from the evidence presented to the grand jury and the grand
jury did not issue the amended indictments, Huckabay was denied the right to an indictment by a
grand jury under the Idaho Constitution, Article I, § 8.
3. Huckabay Denied His Right to a Independent Determination of Probable Cause
The State’s citations to State v. Schmierer, 159 Idaho 768, 367 P.3d 163, 166 (2016) only
confirm Huckabay’s arguments the amended indictments were void and a violation of the Idaho
Constitution. Huckabay argued in the district court and on appeal that both amended indictments
were unlawful because each of them were not issued by the grand jury. R., p.p. 383, 377, 517,
524; Appellant’s Opening Brief p.p. 35,40. Schmierer stands for the proposition an amended
indictment that is signed by a prosecutor is an information and the defendant is entitled to a
preliminary hearing. Huckabay should have been given a preliminary hearing to establish
probable cause because the indictments were the product of misconduct, they were a significant
departure from the grand jury proceedings and the prosecutor signed the amended indictments.
The last shortcoming in the indictments was the element of scienter was not pled. The
State’s position is that it only needed to prove Huckabay intended to possess the moose. State’s
Brief at p. 28. The due process clause of the U.S. Constitution, however, greatly limits the
circumstances under which a person can be convicted of a felony based on strict liability or
ordinary negligence. See supra, A2(iii). None of the cases cited by the State analyze the
constitutional issues Huckabay has raised. It is also worth noting even in the drug cases cited by
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the state, the prosecution had to prove the defendant knew the identity of the drug involved in
the case. State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho at 7, 333 P.3d at 118; State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866
P.2d 181, 183 (1993). At a minimum, even if the State was only required to prove Huckabay
intended to possess a moose, the indictment should have included that allegation.
D. Erroneous Grand Jury Proceedings
Appellate review of the grand jury proceedings is appropriate in this case. The
indictment is the instrument that confers subject matter jurisdiction on a court so whether a court
has subject matter jurisdiction depends on the validity of the indictment. State v. Severson, 147
Idaho at 708, 215 P.3d at 428; State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 622, 115 P.3d 710, 713 (2005).
“A challenge asserting the charging document is jurisdictionally deficient is never waived and
may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal.” State v. Hoagland, 160 Idaho
920, 922, 382 P.3d 369, 371 (Idaho Ct. App. 2016) (citing State v. Jones, 140 Idaho at 758, 101
P.3d at 702). The harmless error rule does not apply to jurisdictional challenges. Article 1,
Section 8, of the Idaho Constitution guarantees the right to have a grand jury or a judicial officer
make a proper probable cause determination before being held to answer for any felony.
An invalid indictment does not grant subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Lute, 150 Idaho
837, 840, 252 P.3d 1255, 1258 (2011). In Huckabay’s case, the indictment was invalid because
it was the product of prosecutorial and law enforcement misconduct.
To overcome the undisputed prosecutorial misconduct, the State relies on three cases
involving prosecutors’ statements made during a trial. See State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279,
289, 178 P.3d 644, 654 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 909 P.2d 624, 632
(Idaho Ct. App. 1995); State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 19, 189 P.3d 477, 481 (Idaho Ct. App.
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2008). State’s Brief at pp. 31-32. Those cases are not useful here. In a trial, the defendant has
the benefit of counsel and the opportunity to object and to respond to improper comments made
by the prosecutor. The grand jury proceedings did not provide those protections to Huckabay.
The State cited its cases claiming a prosecutor may urge a jury to view the credibility of a
witness or the State’s theory of the case in a particular way. State’s Brief at p. 32. The
prosecutor’s statements to the Huckabay grand jury went far beyond the kind of statements that
are permitted. In this case, the prosecutor made two separate statements expressing his personal
opinion. Both statements began with the words “I think . . . .” The State concedes such
expressions of personal opinion are not misconduct. State’s Brief at p. 32. To make matters
worse, the prosecutor’s personal opinions were aimed at making the jury believe there was no
need for them to perform their role as independent jurors because the case as a whole was “a cut
and dry case” and evidence was “overwhelming.”
Huckabay’s grand jury was not only influenced by prosecutorial misconduct, the
proceedings were further compromised by inaccurate sworn testimony from a Fish & Game
officer. The Fish and Game officer testified “[Huckabay] stated that he met Will and another
individual at the boat ramp. All of them got into this vehicle of Mr. Cushman’s, drove up the
road to where the moose was, shot the moose and loaded it into Mr. Cushman’s truck...” The
Fish and Game recording of Huckabay’s statements later revealed this testimony was false. Tr.,
p.p. 275-276. This testimony was prejudicial because it created an inference Huckabay was
involved in shooting the moose when actually he said he was not there when the moose was shot.
Because of the erroneous testimony Huckabay was not merely someone who trying to help get a
dead animal out of someone’s yard, he was at least part of a plan to kill the moose.
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Add the fact the officer falsely testified the moose was a trophy animal and that
established a motive for Huckabay to not only kill but possess the animal. R., p.102 (GJ Tr. p.
36, Ls. 2-11). The claim the moose was a trophy animal incites prejudice against Huckabay
personally because the animal was special. Undoubtedly, the officer did not choose to testify
about a trophy animal because he believed it’s alleged special status to be unimportant. The
State’s claim this is essentially irrelevant and of no consequence to this case is simply not true.
The combination of false testimony and prosecutorial misconduct was devastating.
1. Huckabay Was Prejudiced By Misconduct of Prosecutor and Law Enforcement
The grand jury was instructed that in order for Huckabay to be guilty the State had to
prove four elements. The third of those elements was Huckabay did unlawfully kill a cow moose
by shooting in a closed season. The district court ruled there was no evidence whatsoever
Huckabay shot the moose. R., p. 232. Yet based on the prosecutor’s opinion the case was
overwhelming and Huckabay’s alleged admission that he was present when the moose was shot,
the grand jury readily found Huckabay killed the moose.
It is very apparent that the grand jury relied on the false claim Huckabay was there when
the moose was shot and adopted the prosecutor’s opinions about the case to reach its conclusion.
The only way the grand jury could have come close to finding the Huckabay actually shot and
killed the moose was to rely on the misconduct of the prosecutor and officer. After all, the
prosecutor said the evidence the case was overwhelming and cut and dried. He added: “Rarely I
think in cases do you get to see people actually pull a trigger . . . .” R., p. 111 (GJ Tr., p. 73, Ls.
16-17). The implication is clear that Huckabay pulled the trigger and shot the moose.
The State argues the grand jury was instructed to decide if Huckabay either killed or
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possessed the moose and since there was evidence of possession it does not matter that the jury
was mislead and influenced by misconduct. In fact, the grand jury was not asked to make a
finding based on an alternative theory. Remember the grand jury was told the State had to prove
four elements and one of those was that he killed the moose. The State had to prove Huckabay
killed the moose and the misconduct was the reason Huckabay was indicted. If the grand jury did
not believe Huckabay shot the moose he would not have been indicted.
Additionally the misconduct stripped the grand jury of its appointed role as a check on the
prosecutorial discretion. While sweeping away the tainted evidence and measuring what remains
against the elements of the charge works when the issue is the sufficiency of the evidence, that
does not work for prosecutorial misconduct cases like this one. If the prosecutor makes
statements that the State’s case is overwhelming, it is not an adequate remedy to assume the
grand jury would have reached any particular decisionif they had been permitted to deliberate
without improper influence. It is clear the jury did not consider the evidence when finding that
Huckabay shot the moose and, as a result, Huckabay did not get the constitutional protection he
was entitled to receive from the grand jury. The indictments must be dismissed.
2. The Instructions to the Grand Jury Were Deficient
To support the argument that the instructions given to the grand jury were not improper,
the State points to the fact that the information in Hughes did not use the words “combination of
numbers or species.” State’s Brief, p. 36. The Court of Appeals found the information in
Hughes was jurisdictionally deficient, and for that reason alone it should not be the standard by
which to judge any other information or indictment. State v. Hughes, 161 Idaho at 833, 392 P.3d
at 11. Furthermore, just three paragraphs prior to concluding the indictment was jurisdictionally
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deficient, and immediately after quoting the language in the information, the Court of Appeals
stated explicitly: “In order to state the essential facts of an I.C. § 36–1401(c)(3) violation, the
prosecutor must allege that the defendant unlawfully killed, possessed, or wasted any
combination of numbers or species of wildlife within a twelve-month period with a single or
combined reimbursable damage assessment of more than $1,000.” State v. Hughes, 161 Idaho at
832, 392 P.3d at 10. The Court of Appeals stating that certain language should be included in an
information and then finding that the information, which did not include that language, was
jurisdictionally deficient, strongly indicates that the language should be used.
The accumulation of errors in the grand jury proceedings were not harmless. An
indictment was found when there was no evidence to support one of the elements the grand jury
was explicitly asked to find. The subsequent trial did not eliminate these errors but did in fact
amplified the errors to be even more prejudicial. The original indictment was amended twice by
the prosecution, which resulted in an indictment that greatly differed from what the grand jury
was originally asked to find.
E. Jury Instructions Were Fatally Deficient
When it comes to an adequate instruction describing the crime, the State cannot have it
both ways. I.C. § 36-1401(c)(3) is not both too confusing for a jury to understand and
unambiguous at the same time. The instruction’s departure from the statute was not as the State
suggests a matter of narrowing alternative ways to commit the same crime. The instruction in
this case eliminated actual elements of the crime enacted by the legislature. The district court’s
instruction misled the jury. Enough has been said about this defect already.
The same is true for the failure to instruct on an unlawful taking under I.C. § 36-502(b)
-40-

and I.C. § 36-202(i). Much has also been written in support of the proposition the instructions
should have informed the jury scienter is an element of the felony that was charged in this case.
It should be noted the State cites no authorities and offers no analysis explaining the failure of the
instructions to inform the jury the State needed prove scienter to support this crime. This
undefended constitutional error alone warrants reversal. Any of these problems in the
instructions to the jury warrant reversal, one additional point needs to be made.
Even if the State’s briefing that I.C. 36-1401 (c) (3)is only a general intent crime is
correct, a reversal is still required because the instructions do not satisfy that minimal standard.
Using the State’s analysis it is clear the jury should at least have been informed proof that
Huckabay intended to possess the moose carcass was essential. Proposed instructions D 18 and
D 20 would have addressed this lowest standard of proof. R., p.p. 555, 557. The Court’s
instructions misled the jury into believing that Huckabay would be guilty just because he was
present while the moose was being possessed even if he had no intention to possess it.
The argument the omission of any intent element in the jury instructions was harmless is
also without merit. There is a great deal of evidence Huckabay did not intend to commit a crime
or even intend to possess the moose. The State introduced evidence that Huckabay was called by
a friend about a troublesome moose. Tr., p. 327. This incident was not instigated by Huckabay.
When Huckabay encountered two citzens while the moose was hanging from Bob Cushman’s
truck, Huckabay accurately identified himself and correctly described where he lived. Tr. p. 204.
This conduct can be seen as evidence Huckabay did not think anything was amiss.
Huckabay also stated his belief that there was a tag for the moose. He said: “Yes, we have
a tag.” Tr. p. 213. He also was not driving the truck the moose was hanging from. Tr. p. 205.
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The truck did not belong to Huckabay, it belonged to Bob Cushman. Tr. pp. 256, 264-265. The
person driving the truck identified himself as Bob. Tr. p. 205.
Huckabay volunteered to come to Fish and Game to talk with the officers. Tr. pp. 273274. During his meeting with the officers, Huckabay identified Bob Cushman and gave the
officers a general description of the location of Cushman’s butcher shop. Tr. p. 274.
There was no sign the moose had been put in Huckabay’s truck. Tr. pp. 268-269. When
officers went to Huckabay’s home, there was no evidence the moose had been taken there. Tr. p.
269. Instead, the moose had been in Cushman’s truck and the moose was found in Cushman’s
cooler at his butcher shop. Cushman was in possession of the moose. Tr. pp. 284-285. The
moose was cut and processed in a way that could not be done without butcher equipment. Tr. p.
265. Cushman lied about his possession of the moose saying it was a bad cow. Tr. pp. 269, 285.
Huckabay took the officers to kill site. Tr. p. 274.
The foregoing evidence could be the basis for a jury verdict that Huckabay did not intend
to commit the crime or even intend to possess the moose. Huckabay did not act like a person
who had committed a crime and there was ample evidence that Huckabay did not intend to
possess the moose. Based on the district court’s jury instructions, the defense was not able to
make this argument to the jury and it was not able to deliberate about this important issue. The
evidence shows that Cushman, not Huckabay, was in control of the moose and Cushman’s
property was used to exercise that control. The jury should have made a final determination about
who intended to possess the moose.
CONCLUSION
Huckabay requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence and
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remand this case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the Second Amended
Indictment with prejudice based on a lack of jurisdiction, a failure to allege the essential elements
and facts to establish a felony in the Second Amended Indictment, prejudicial prosecutorial
misconduct before the grand jury, and a failure to instruct the petit jury properly.
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of September, 2019.
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